Service for machine and plant builders
Cybersecurity risk assessment under the Machinery Regulation and the CRA – per system type, ready to sign in two weeks.
From 20 January 2027 the Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 applies. With it, protection against corruption becomes one of the essential requirements that have to be met before CE marking (Annex III, 1.1.9 and 1.2.1). This covers the connection to other devices, including via USB and remote access, as well as safety-relevant software and data. From 11 December 2027 the CRA additionally requires a documented cybersecurity risk assessment for the product itself (Art. 13(2) and (3)).
Both come out of one threat analysis per system type. The Machinery Regulation takes the scenarios that hit a safety function, the CRA the mapping to Annex I including residual risks. We produce this base assessment in two sessions with your design team; after two weeks it is ready to sign. After that, each order only documents what differs from the system type.
The assessment ends at the interface to the customer network
The first decision comes before the first threat: where does the installation end? The most workable boundary so far is this one: the customer network stays outside, the interface to it is inside. The assessment therefore covers:
- the plant network with fieldbus (PROFINET, EtherCAT), controllers and drives
- the operator level: HMI and local control panels
- USB ports and removable media
- remote maintenance router and VPN access
- the firewall to the customer network and the MES/ERP connection, usually via OPC UA
- physical access to the control cabinet
- the commissioning laptop, which sits in several networks during commissioning
Not part of the assessment are the operator's IT network and the firmware of purchased components. What is inside a purchased PLC is assessed by its manufacturer; the plant builder may rely on that manufacturer's advisories.
Two sessions, with the threat analysis in between
- 1
System capture
Together with engineering or project management we capture the system type: network diagram, components, interfaces, remote maintenance path and the assumptions about the operating environment.
- 2
Threat analysis
We ask the six STRIDE questions per interface, rate the risks, define measures and map every row to CRA Annex I, and additionally to Machinery Regulation Annex III where a safety function is affected.
- 3
Walkthrough with the design team
In the second session we go through the results with the design team. They sign the assessment, and the session is there so that they know what they are signing.
After two weeks the assessment is ready to sign.
The finished assessment consists of six parts
- System description with network diagram, zones and data flows, operating environment and assumptions
- Threat analysis per interface using STRIDE
- Risk rating with measures, referenced to IEC 62443-3-3 and -4-2
- Mapping to CRA Annex I for the technical documentation and to Machinery Regulation Annex III for the risk assessment under EN ISO 12100
- Residual risks with justification and the assumptions that belong in the instructions for use
- Maintenance rule: when the assessment is revisited and how the per-order delta is documented
Special-purpose machines also need one assessment per system type, not per order
The most common objection is: “Every one of our installations is unique.” For the cyber threat picture that is rarely true. The attack surface is defined by the control platform, the operator level, the remote maintenance path and the connection to the customer network, and these repeat across the portfolio. That is why we scope the assessment by control platform and interfaces, not by order.
The Commission reads the CRA the same way: for variants with the same architecture and the same risks, one shared risk assessment is sufficient; different interfaces or a different remote access have to be reflected in it (Guidelines C(2026) 5252, paras 174 to 176, not legally binding). That is exactly the per-order delta: additional interfaces, the specific MES connection, different components.
We review an existing template as a gap analysis
If you already have your own template or first assessments, you do not start from scratch. We check the document against Machinery Regulation Annex III 1.1.9 and 1.2.1, CRA Art. 13 and Annex I, and the content list for threat models in IEC 62443-4-1 (SR-2), and state for each gap what has to be added.
Afterwards the assessment becomes the template for the following projects
The risk assessment is the one-off part of CRA work. In Werkspilot it serves as the template for further projects of the same type. What stays ongoing is vulnerability management across the delivered installations. The method and a worked STRIDE example on a packaging machine are in the article on risk assessment.
Frequently asked questions on cybersecurity risk assessment
Request an intro call on the risk assessment.
30 minutes on system type, interfaces and schedule. We reply by email with proposed dates.
