MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: where the threats in a machine's risk assessment come from
In brief · As of November 2026
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS is a freely available knowledge base that describes how attackers have actually operated in control system environments: 78 techniques in 12 tactics, from initial access to the impact on the process (version 20.1, November 2026). In a machine's risk assessment it answers the question of where the threats come from. Every element of the data flow diagram corresponds to an asset type in ATT&CK, and each asset type lists the techniques that affect it. Per interface this gives a chain of access, action and consequence, and that chain is one line in the risk register. STRIDE remains the method, ATT&CK provides the content for it. The measures come from IEC 62443. Neither the CRA nor the Machinery Regulation prescribes the catalogue.
In conversations with design departments the same question comes up at the same point almost every time: we can draw the data flow diagram, but how do we know which threats exist for our system? A controls engineer described it like this: you know the network and the controller, but for the risks you want to be able to say yes or no instead of looking up every line in a framework.
The framework we use as our reference for threats is MITRE ATT&CK for ICS. How the assessment is structured overall and what the CRA and the Machinery Regulation need from it is covered in the article on the cybersecurity risk assessment under the Machinery Regulation and CRA. This article covers one step of it: how a data flow diagram and ATT&CK for ICS turn into a threat list. If you would rather not go through the steps yourself, the end of the article describes the list you can answer with yes or no.
ATT&CK for ICS describes observed attacker behaviour in control system environments
MITRE is a US not-for-profit research organisation. ATT&CK for ICS is one of three ATT&CK matrices, alongside Enterprise and Mobile, and the only one tailored to control systems. A tactic is the goal of an attack step, such as initial access. A technique is the way to get there, such as a remote maintenance access with a default password. A technique has an ID and a description and, as a rule, documented incidents, the asset types it affects and mitigations.
Version 20 has been current since 13 October 2026, at present as 20.1 of 5 November 2026. It contains 12 tactics, 78 techniques and 26 sub-techniques, 53 mitigations, 18 asset types and 10 documented campaigns. Two tactics have no counterpart in the Enterprise and Mobile matrices: Inhibit Response Function (disabling protection and response functions) and Impair Process Control (manipulating the control of the process). The figures in this article come from our analysis of the dataset published by MITRE, carried out on 18 November 2026.
The threat list needs three questions: access, action, consequence
The twelve tactics cover an entire attack, including reconnaissance, movement through the network and concealment. That is the view of the operator who wants to detect an attack in progress. The manufacturer of a machine needs less for a line in the risk register, namely three answers:
- Access: how does someone get to the machine? This is the Initial Access tactic with 12 techniques.
- Action: what do they do to the controller? This is mainly Execution (9 techniques), Persistence (5), Impair Process Control (4) and Inhibit Response Function (13).
- Consequence: what happens to the process, the machine and people? This is the Impact tactic with 12 techniques.
The remaining tactics (Discovery, Lateral Movement, Collection, Command and Control, Evasion, Privilege Escalation) describe the path in between. They matter for logging and detection but rarely produce a line of their own. This three-part split is how we work, not something MITRE specifies.
From the data flow diagram to the threat list in five steps
1. Map elements to asset types
ATT&CK for ICS lists 18 asset types and records for each technique which of them it affects. The elements of a typical machine can be found there:
| Element in the data flow diagram | Asset type in ATT&CK | Techniques assigned |
|---|---|---|
| PLC | Programmable Logic Controller (PLC, A0003) | 45 |
| Safety controller | Safety Controller (A0010) | 44 |
| Operator panel | Human-Machine Interface (HMI, A0002) | 44 |
| Engineering or service laptop | Workstation (A0001) | 42 |
| Remote maintenance router with VPN | Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server (A0011) | 30 |
| Switch | Switch (A0015) | 31 |
| Remote I/O, sensors, variable frequency drives | Field I/O (A0013) | 21 |
The counts are techniques without sub-techniques, as of version 20.1. The twelve consequences of the Impact tactic are not assigned to any asset type and apply to every line. 45 techniques for a PLC are too many to go through line by line, and some of them are intermediate steps. The list gets shorter when you start at the interfaces.
2. Determine the access per interface
The twelve techniques of the Initial Access tactic map to the points where data enters the machine:
- Remote maintenance access: External Remote Services (T0822), Internet Accessible Device (T0883), Exploit Public-Facing Application (T0819)
- Engineering access and service laptop: Transient Cyber Asset (T0864), Remote Services (T0886)
- USB ports and removable media: Replication Through Removable Media (T0847)
- Interface to the customer network: Exploitation of Remote Services (T0866), Remote Services (T0886)
- Machine network and fieldbus: Rogue Master (T0848)
- Wi-Fi, where present: Wireless Compromise (T0860)
- Purchased components and updates: Supply Chain Compromise (T0862)
Spearphishing Attachment (T0865) and Drive-by Compromise (T0817) hit the operator's office IT and lie outside the machine. They belong in the assumptions about the operating environment.
3. Determine the action per element
This is where the asset mapping helps. On a PLC, the actions that appear in almost every assessment are Program Download (T0843), Modify Program (T0889), Modify Parameter (T0836), Change Operating Mode (T0858), Unauthorized Message (T1692), Modify Firmware (T1693), Device Restart/Shutdown (T0816) and Denial of Service (T0814). How the attacker gets past the login is described by Valid Accounts (T0859) and Insecure Credentials (T1694) with the sub-techniques Default Credentials and Hardcoded Credentials. The assignment to tactics in ATT&CK is not always obvious: Program Download sits under Lateral Movement.
4. Name the consequence
The Impact tactic provides twelve consequences, among them Loss of Safety (T0880), Damage to Property (T0879), Manipulation of Control (T0831), Loss of Control (T0827), Loss of View (T0829), Loss of Availability (T0826), Loss of Productivity and Revenue (T0828) and Theft of Operational Information (T0882). The consequence determines the severity and is also the switch between the regulations: if it can endanger people or defeat a safety function, the line additionally belongs in the risk assessment under the Machinery Regulation. Theft of recipe data is a case for the CRA only.
5. Write the scenario and derive the measures
The line in the risk register describes the scenario in the words of your own machine; the ATT&CK IDs sit next to it as a reference. For the measures, ATT&CK lists mitigations for almost every technique, and 40 of the 53 carry a reference to IEC 62443, 37 of them to both parts 3-3 and 4-2. Password Policies (M0927) points to SR 1.5 and CR 1.5, Network Segmentation (M0930) to SR 5.1 and CR 5.1, Human User Authentication (M0804) to SR 1.1 and CR 1.1. The references should be checked against the standard: Multi-factor Authentication (M0932) points to SR 1.7 at MITRE, while the standard covers the second factor under SR 1.1 (RE 2 and RE 3).
Three examples on a packaging machine
The machine is the same as in the article on the risk assessment: PLC and safety controller, operator panel, servo drives on PROFINET, a remote maintenance router with VPN and an OPC UA connection to the operator's MES.
Remote maintenance access with the factory password
The remote maintenance router is reachable from the internet and runs with the password that every machine of the series ships with. The chain is Internet Accessible Device (T0883), Insecure Credentials: Default Credentials (T1694.001), Modify Program (T0889) and Loss of Control (T0827). The most recent campaign in the catalogue followed this pattern. According to ATT&CK entry C0066, from 27 July 2026 controllers at more than 30 municipal water and wastewater utilities in Minnesota were attacked that were reachable from the internet through cellular gateways. The attackers logged in with default credentials, changed IP addresses and passwords and, in at least one case, the control logic. In November 2023 the same access pattern hit Unitronics controllers with an integrated operator panel (C0031).
For these techniques ATT&CK names, among others, Password Policies (M0927), Access Management (M0801) and Network Segmentation (M0930), and for the remote access itself (External Remote Services, T0822) also Multi-factor Authentication (M0932). On the machine this means: no shared factory password, a forced password change at commissioning, remote maintenance only through VPN with individual accounts and a second factor, and switchable by the operator.
Service laptop on the engineering port
A service technician connects a laptop that has previously been in other networks. The chain: Transient Cyber Asset (T0864), Program Download (T0843), with the controller running as an Online Edit (T0843.002), then Manipulation of Control (T0831). If the change hits the safety program, the consequence is Loss of Safety (T0880). The incidents ATT&CK cites for program download include Stuxnet, which loaded code and data blocks into the PLC, and Triton, which in 2017 transferred programs to Triconex safety controllers over the TriStation protocol.
The mitigations for Program Download include Authorization Enforcement (M0800), Human User Authentication (M0804), Code Signing (M0945) and Audit (M0947). On the machine: access protection on the CPU, a separate password for the safety program, a check of the program signature after service visits and a log of download operations. From 20 January 2027 the Machinery Regulation requires that log as well (Annex III section 1.1.9); more on this in the article on logging on the control system.
Drive parameters over the machine network
Anyone who is in the machine network through one of the two routes can reach the servo drives. The chain: Modify Parameter (T0836) or Unauthorized Message: Command Message (T1692.001), with the consequence Damage to Property (T0879) or Loss of Safety (T0880). ATT&CK assigns both techniques mainly to the controllers from which the drive receives its setpoints. Stuxnet, for example, sent the frequency converters instructions that, among other things, changed the maximum frequency. According to ATT&CK, the attack tool INCONTROLLER, discovered in 2022, can use Omron controllers to change parameters on servo drives connected over EtherCAT.
Mitigations according to ATT&CK: Authorization Enforcement (M0800), Validate Program Inputs (M0818), Communication Authenticity (M0802), Network Segmentation (M0930) and, for the consequence Loss of Safety, an independent protection layer (Safety Instrumented Systems, M0812). On the machine: monitor limits in the drive's safety function, for example with safely-limited speed, so that a changed parameter does not become a hazard; protect the parameterisation access; separate the machine network from the customer network.
| Scenario | ATT&CK chain | Measure (IEC 62443-3-3) | Applies to |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remote maintenance router reachable from the internet, factory password not changed; program changed by a third party, operator loses control. | T0883, T1694.001, T0889, T0827 | Individual accounts, forced password change (SR 1.5), second factor (SR 1.1 RE 2), access switchable by the operator. | CRA + MR |
| Compromised service laptop downloads a modified program to the PLC or safety controller. | T0864, T0843.002, T0831, T0880 | Access protection on the CPU (SR 1.1, SR 2.1), check of the program signature, log of download operations. | CRA + MR |
| Drive parameters changed from the machine network; speed or torque outside the design limits. | T0836 or T1692.001, T0879, T0880 | Safe limits in the drive, parameterisation access protected (SR 2.1), segmentation (SR 5.1). | CRA + MR |
In the CRA these lines belong to Annex I Part I(2), among others point (b) (secure by default configuration), point (d) (protection from unauthorised access) and point (f) (integrity of programs and configuration).
STRIDE provides the categories, ATT&CK the specific techniques
STRIDE makes sure no category is missed per interface. ATT&CK fills the category with a named technique and the evidence that it has occurred in real plants. There is no official mapping; the following is ours:
| STRIDE category | Matching techniques in ATT&CK for ICS (selection) |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | Rogue Master (T0848), Valid Accounts (T0859), Unauthorized Message: Reporting Message (T1692.002) |
| Tampering | Modify Program (T0889), Modify Parameter (T0836), Modify Firmware (T1693) |
| Repudiation | Indicator Removal on Host (T0872) |
| Information Disclosure | Program Upload (T0845), Network Sniffing (T0842), Theft of Operational Information (T0882) |
| Denial of Service | Denial of Service (T0814), Device Restart/Shutdown (T0816), Block Communications (T1695) |
| Elevation of Privilege | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T0890), Insecure Credentials (T1694) |
ATT&CK has little for Repudiation, because missing traceability is a property of the system and not an attack step. Conversely, ATT&CK lists techniques that six abstract questions rarely lead to: Change Operating Mode (T0858), Activate Firmware Update Mode (T0800) or Alarm Suppression (T0878).
ATT&CK for ICS is not a complete threat catalogue for a product
The catalogue has four limits:
- Observed behaviour only. The catalogue describes behaviour that has been publicly documented. A new technique is added only after it has been noticed. The assessment becomes complete by working systematically along the interfaces.
- The operator's view. Many techniques play out in the operator's network before the machine is reached. For the manufacturer these become assumptions about the operating environment, and those belong in the instructions for use.
- No rating. ATT&CK says nothing about likelihood and severity. Both depend on the plant and remain the job of the assessment.
- Not the inside of the component. What can go wrong in the firmware of a purchased controller is assessed by its manufacturer. MITRE has a separate catalogue for that, EMB3D, which organises threats to embedded devices by their properties.
The IDs also change. Up to version 18 the ICS matrix had 83 techniques and no sub-techniques. Version 19 (April 2026) brought sub-techniques and replaced nine IDs with new ones; Default Credentials T0812, for example, became T1694.001. Version 20 (October 2026) withdrew two more IDs (T0807, T0853) and introduced T1701. The risk register should therefore record the version next to the IDs.
Neither the CRA nor the Machinery Regulation prescribes a catalogue
The CRA requires the risk assessment (Art. 13(2) and (3)) but names no method and no catalogue. The Commission FAQ (v1.4, no. 4.1.2) expects threat modelling that fits the intended purpose of the product. ATT&CK appears neither there nor in the guidance C(2026) 5252. The Machinery Regulation does not name a method either.
The most specific source is EN 40000-1-2 from the series of standards for the CRA (principles, product risk management and lifecycle activities). It was ratified on 2 November 2026 and, according to CEN-CENELEC, has been available since 18 November 2026; citation in the Official Journal is not expected there. We cite the draft prEN 40000-1-2 from the public enquiry of October 2025 here, so clause numbers and wording of the final version may differ. In the draft, clause 6.4.3 names TVRA, attack trees, PASTA and STRIDE as examples of threat modelling approaches. Among the required inputs are the common threats related to the product, and the draft notes that these can be derived from existing threat catalogues. It names the standardisation committee's own threat catalogue (TR JT013097) and, as an example of a sector-specific catalogue, MITRE EMB3D. ATT&CK for ICS is not in the draft. In our reading it is a comparable catalogue for the plant level.
For a short list to cross-check against, the German BSI publishes "Industrial Control System Security: Top 10 Threats and Countermeasures" (BSI-CS 005E, version 1.5, 2022). It does not replace ATT&CK, but it quickly shows whether a threat list has missed one of the major categories.
The yes-or-no list: threats are tied to the function, not the make
Nobody should have to read 78 techniques for every machine. In our risk assessments and in the platform, the threats are therefore already recorded per component. They are tied to the function of an element: controller, operator panel, router, switch, drive. Whether the controller comes from Siemens or Beckhoff hardly changes the threats, but it does change the measures and the vulnerabilities. Every threat in the catalogue comes with an initial rating, measures, the requirements from IEC 62443-3-3 and CRA Annex I that it covers, and the reference to the ATT&CK technique. Building blocks such as remote maintenance access, on-site engineering access, connection to the supervisory system or MES, or update via removable media bring their risks with them as soon as they are dragged into the data flow diagram.
In a joint workshop this becomes the list for your plants: your design team decides line by line whether it applies and rates it. That is the yes-or-no list people ask for in these conversations. Per system type it comes to a few dozen risks. How this becomes a baseline assessment, ready for signature after two sessions, is described on the page on the cybersecurity risk assessment.
Figures on ATT&CK for ICS: our own analysis of the dataset published by MITRE, version 20.1, on 18 November 2026. Statements about incidents reflect the entries in ATT&CK. The mappings to STRIDE and to the interfaces of a machine are Werkspilot's assessment. This article is not legal advice; the regulations themselves are authoritative. The Commission FAQ and guidance are not legally binding; EN 40000-1-2 is cited from the 2025 draft prEN 40000-1-2. ATT&CK is a registered trademark and EMB3D a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
